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INTRODUCTION
The topic of this essay is what I name “Christian dualism,” the idea that God
the Creator and creatures comprise an exhaustive and mutually exclusive
classification of the contents of reality. I am concerned with one of the most
penetrating discussions of this issue to be found in the early thirteenth
century, Robert Grosseteste’s treatment of challenges to Christian dualism.
No orthodox thinker, of course, doubted the truth of Christian dualism;
however, from the mid-twelfth century we find a realization that ostensibly
plausible arguments could be mounted against it, arguments drawn in part
from the area we should describe as philosophical logic, and in particular
from reflections on the doctrine of the enuntiabile. Grosseteste himself dis-
cussed this issue in two works, each probably written at Oxford in the late
1220s. The first work, De veritate, which is largely devoted to the question
whether there is a single truth, the supreme Truth, or are instead many
truths, at one point confronts the suggestion that the beginningless nature of
the truth of certain enuntiabilia suggests that there is a plurality of items that
may be identified with neither God nor creatures. The second work, De libero
arbitrio, is extant in two recensions, of which the later, designated as recension
I in Baur’s edition, discusses Christian dualism in order to remove doubts
posed by Grosseteste’s assertion, advanced in the earlier recension, that
there is a plurality of eternal relations between God and creatures and vice
versa.1 The discussion in the second recension appears to be a development
of material in De veritate, some of which it shares verbatim.
An earlier version of this paper was read at the Tenth International Congress
of Medieval Philosophy, at Erfurt in 1997.
1. Both texts were edited by L. Baur in Die philosophischen Werke des Robert
Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln (BGPM 9) (Münster, 1912). Baur’s editions, especially
of De libero arbitrio, must be used with caution. I have reedited the first recension of
De libero arbitrio in Mediaeval Studies 53 (1991): 1–88, and I am in the advanced stages
of preparing a new edition of the later recension that, in addition to the manu-
scripts used by Baur (Worcester, Cathedral Library F. 152; Florence, Bibl.
Laurenziana Plut. 18, dext. 7; and Oxford, Exeter College 28), employs Durham,
Cathedral Library A.iii. 12; Florence, Bibl. Marucelliana C. 163, and London,
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Grosseteste’s discussion influenced a number of later writers, including
Richard Rufus of Cornwall, who quotes pertinent material from De libero
arbitrio in his commentary on the Metaphysics, written before ca. 1238, and
William of Alnwick, who quotes extensively from parallel material in De
veritate in his sixth disputed question on intelligible being, written ca. 1316.2
SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST CHRISTIAN DUALISM
We can get an idea of the problems Grosseteste is dealing with by consider-
ing some of the arguments he is concerned to rebut. The first concerns the
status of certain enuntiabilia or dicta,3 the primary bearers of truth value
(indicated by italics in the translations below):
What is true, is true by truth, and by truth that is and that is something.
But that which is purely nothing, cannot be informed by truth that is.
Therefore, if it is informed by truth, it is not purely nothing. But before
every creature that no creature exists was true. Therefore, that no creature
exists, when it was informed by truth, was not purely nothing. Nor was
it a creature, for there was not yet a creature. Nor was it God, for the
following was not true: “God is that no creature exists.” There existed,
then, it seems, what was neither the Creator nor a creature.4
British Library, Cotton Otho D.x. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in this
paper are from the later recension and use the text of my unpublished edition (I
have also added references to parallel passages in Baur’s edition); all italics in
quotations are my own, unless otherwise noted. I have regularized the orthography
of all Latin quotations in this paper in line with the Oxford Latin Dictionary.
2. On Rufus’s commentary, see G. Gal, “Commentarius in Metaphysicam Aris-
totelis, Cod. Vat. lat. 4538, fons doctrinae Richardi Rufi,” Archivum Franciscanum Histo-
ricum 43 (1950): 209–42. For Alnwick, see Fr. Guillelmi Alnwick, O.F.M., Quaestiones
disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quodlibet, ed. P. Ledoux (Florence, 1937), p. 167 f.
3. Grosseteste uses the terms “enuntiabile” and “dictum” interchangeably to
refer to what is or can be stated by the assertoric utterance of an indicative sentence
(a propositio or enuntiatio). For theories of the enuntiabile, see G. Nuchelmans,
Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and
Falsity (Amsterdam, 1973); and N. Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning
of the Propositio,” The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970): 767–87.
4. “Quod verum est, veritate verum est, et veritate quae est et quae aliquid est.
Sed quod pure nihil est, veritate quae est non potest informari. Ergo si informatur
veritate, non pure nihil est. Sed ante creaturam omnem verum fuit nullam creaturam
esse. Ergo nullam creaturam esse, cum informabatur veritate, non fuit pure nihil; nec
fuit creatura, quia nondum fuit creatura; nec fuit Deus, non enim fuit haec vera:
‘Deus est nullam creaturam esse.’ Fuit igitur, ut videtur, quod nec fuit Creator nec
creatura” (cf. Baur, p.191.18–25). This argument is also present in William of
Auvergne’s De universo 1.3.25. I note below other doctrinal parallels between Wil-
liam and Grosseteste.
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In this passage, the attack on Christian dualism is explicit. The negative
existential dictum or enuntiabile, that no creature exists, being true prior to the
existence of any creature, must, like God, have existed prior to any creature,
and yet cannot be identified with God.
Another argument focuses on the notion of eternality. According to
Grosseteste and his fellow Christian thinkers, God alone is an eternal being;
no creature is eternal, not, at least, in the sense of eternity at issue, accord-
ing to which eternity is radically distinct from and prior to time by some
kind of non-temporal priority.5 It is to this priority that the term “before” in
the phrase “before every creature” in the above passage refers. It would
seem to suffice to attack Christian dualism if it could be shown that some-
thing, besides God, is eternal or has existed from eternity. But once again,
certain enuntiabilia appear to be like this:
The following dicta: that Peter was going to exist, and that Paul was going to
exist, and so on, for every creature, that it was going to exist, were true
from eternity. Therefore, they have existed from eternity. Is, then, God
that Paul was going to exist and any one you please of such dicta, or are
those dicta the same as one another? For it they are not the same, then
several things exist from eternity.6
Finally, some arguments focus on the notion of ‘beginninglessness’. If
something begins, it must exist after it did not exist. Thus, before it exists,
it must have not existed. All creatures have begun to exist, even those that
exist at every time or that, like angels, do not exist in time, for according to
Grosseteste eternity is before all creatures, in a non-temporal sense of
“before,” and no creatures exist in eternity. Thus, all creatures exist after
they have not existed. God, on the other hand, does not begin, since he
does not exist after not-existing, as nothing is before eternity. Christian
dualism may, therefore, also be attacked, it seems, by showing that some-
thing besides God exists without beginning to exist. Not only may this be
argued about various kinds of enuntiabilia, but also, as in the following
argument, about their truths (veritates), these truths being construed by
Grosseteste as relations of adequation between dicta and the eternal Word:7
The truths (veritates) of such dicta as that something was going to exist are
without a beginning and differ from each other. For the truth of the
5. Cf. Grosseteste, De ordine emanandi causatorum a Deo (ed. Baur, p.148).
6. “Talia dicta Pectrum fuisse futurum et Paulum fuisse futurum, et sic de omni
creatura, illam fuisse futuram, ab aeterno fuerunt vera. Ergo ab aeterno fuerunt.
Numquid itaque Deus est Paulum fuisse futurum et quodlibet talium dictorum, aut
ista dicta eadem sunt ad invicem? Si enim non eadem, tunc plura ab aeterno sunt”
(cf. Baur, p. 189.20–25).
7. This view of truth bears similarities to the account we find in William of
Auvergne; see S. Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, New Ideas of
Truth in the Early Thirteenth Century (Princeton, 1983), p. 217.
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dictum that something was going to exist is not the same as the truth of that
seven and three are ten. For the conformity of the latter to its utterance
in the eternal Word is one thing, and the conformity of the former is
another. There are, then, several—indeed, countless—things without a
beginning, and they will be without an end.8
In addition to these arguments, Grosseteste presents many others, all
variations on the above themes. His primary concern is to provide a careful
analysis of arguments of the second kind, which try to show that there is a
plurality of eternal items, and I focus on such arguments below. It will be
clear enough from this account how Grosseteste would extend his remarks
to arguments of the other kinds.
TO WHAT IS CHRISTIAN DUALISM COMMITTED?
Central to Grosseteste’s defense of Christian dualism is his conception of
just what Christian dualism claims. This is far from a straightforward matter.
Everything is either God or a creature, but exactly what does the term
“everything” cover in this context? Appeals to credal formulae, which we
might expect to help clarify the doctrine, provide no clarity on this point.
The Nicene Creed, for example, states: “We believe in one God the Father
almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invis-
ible.”9 And John 1:3 states that “all things were made by Him.” But what does
the expression “all things” stand for in such passages? It turns out that
defenders of Christian dualism had quite definite views on what counts as a
“thing” for the purposes of this debate.
It is not clear when challenges to Christian dualism first arose, but they
are certainly an issue of interest and concern by the mid-twelfth century. In
his Metalogicon, written in the 1150s, John of Salisbury indicates that devel-
opments in logic had led to doubts over, and, it would seem, outright attacks
on Christian dualism. He mentions, for example, “those forms that the
logicians imagine are not dependent on the Creator,” and thus are not
creatures, and he discusses the view that certain vera (that is, certain enun-
tiabilia signified by true propositions), are neither the Creator nor crea-
tures.10 Clearly some thinkers must have been proposing such views or must
8. “Similiter veritates talium dictorum aliquid fuisse futurum sine initio sunt;
et alterae ab invicem sunt. Non enim est eadem veritas huius dicti aliquid fuisse
futurum et huiusmodi septem et tria esse decem. Altera est enim conformitas huius ad
suam dictionem in aeterno Verbo et altera illius. Sunt igitur plura, immo innumer-
abilia, sine initio et erunt sine fine” (De veritate, ed. Baur, p. 140).
9. See H. Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church (Oxford, 1963), p.
26.
10. Metalogicon, ed. J.B. Hall (CCCM 98) (Turnhout, 1991), pp. 93–94, p. 176.
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have been taken to have been doing so. We have no idea who they were,
however.11
This issue is also discussed at some length in Robert of Melun, under
whom John of Salisbury had studied. Robert’s Sententiae, written ca.
1152–1260,12 contain an extended discussion of the question whether there
is something that is neither the Creator nor a creature. Robert’s focus is on
arguments that certain true enuntiabilia, those concerning the Godhead, are
neither the Creator nor creatures. Robert’s response to such arguments
attempts to clarify what Christian dualism is committed to. He thinks that we
need not fear such arguments, for “it is possible for there to be many truths
(vera), even though no things (rebus) at all exist.”13 This, and similar passages,
indicate that Robert takes the notion of a res or an essentia rei to be crucial to
the formulation of Christian dualism. Robert explains the notion of a res or
essentia rei as that of what is or, at least, can be signified by a non-complex
expression. That which can be signified only by means of complex expres-
sions is not a res or essentia rei. Enuntiabilia, Robert claims, no doubt under
Abelard’s influence, are precisely of this sort, for they can be signified only
through the use of quod-clauses or accusative-plus-infinitive constructions.14
According to Robert, Christian dualism’s division of the contents of reality
into Creator and creatures is to be construed as a division among res or
essentiae rerum. The fact that certain enuntiabilia may be identified with nei-
ther Creator nor creature does not, therefore, serve to undermine the claims
made by Christian dualism, since enuntiabilia are neither res nor essentiae
11. It is perhaps tempting to see some such views in certain twelfth-century
works that posit unusual modes of being for items such as predicables, enuntiabilia,
and so forth (see for example, the Ars Burana in Logica Modernorum 2:2, ed. L. M.
de Rijk (Assen, 1967), p. 208; and the Ars Meliduna, in ibid. 2:1, p. 308). But we must
be wary of construing such doctrines as attacks on Christian dualism. John of
Salisbury himself, for example, thought that enuntiabilia had their own peculiar
mode of being, but quite emphatically held that this did not undermine Christian
dualism.
12. See Sententiae 1.5.57–58, in Ouvres de Robert de Melun, vol. 3:2, ed. R.-M.
Martin and R. M. Gallet (Louvain, 1952).
13. Robert writes: “Ait enim Aristoteles in libro Interpretationum circa composi-
tionem et divisionem esse veritatem et falsitatem. Quare vero hoc diceret, nulla alia
videtur ratio, nisi quia veritatis vocabulum ac veri ipsam rerum cohaerentiam ac
discohaerentiam solas suscipere voluit, quae quasi quidam modi sunt et nullae
rerum essentiae. Unde et ipse Aristoteles in eodem volumine verum inter modos
enumerat quos nullas res esse certissimum est, eo quod nullis rebus existentibus esse
possunt” (ed. Martin and Gallet, p. 278; eds.’ italics).
14. Although he uses the language of substantiae, not of res or essentiae, John of
Salisbury follows Robert on this point. He writes: “Quod autem omnis res aut
creator dicitur aut creatura, ad substantias et ad ea quae substantiis insunt
quocumque modo, ex auctoritate Patrum, universitatis complexio revocatur. Nam
enuntiationum significata non contingit, urgente aliqua ratione sermonis. Qui
enim sic partiti sunt, respexerunt ad incomplexorum significationes. Non nihil
ergo sunt vera quae in mente Dei consistunt, sed nec creaturae sunt, eo quod ab
aeterno extiterunt” (ed. Hill, p. 176).
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rerum. Although one way to construe this view is as holding that the Christian
dualist is only making a division of a sub-class of the contents of reality, I think
that Robert intends something rather different. His view seems rather to be
that any items, such as enuntiabilia, that appear to fall outside the division of
res into Creator and creature are not really items in our ontology. Some kind
of account must be given that shows that ostensible references to such items
are misleading. Robert’s point that enuntiabilia may be signified only by the
use of complex expressions is, I would suggest, a way of making this point that
they are not really proper items of reference at all.15
We find what  may  be  a trace of this twelfth-century discussion in
Grosseteste. Although he does not explain the concept of a res or essentia rei
in terms of the notion of signification, he does, like Robert, insist that the
arguments mounted against Christian dualism fail to prove the existence of
a plurality of items of a kind that would serve to undermine Christian
dualism, and, echoing Robert, he thinks that only a plurality of eternal
essentiae would do so. Thus, noting his claim earlier in De libero arbitrio that
“there are countless eternal relations of the Creator to creatures and vice
versa,” Grosseteste writes:
From this it seems to some that several things (plura) are eternal and
that something other than God is eternal, although we have frequently
added and confirmed that only a single thing, the triune God, is
eternal, and that no such relations at all give rise to a multitude of eternal
essences. Firmly and faithfully, therefore, we have supposed only one
eternal thing, God, and not that any essence other than or divided from him
is eternal.16
Thus, according to Grosseteste, only a plurality of eternal essences other
than or divided from God would serve to undermine Christian dualism.17
This claim requires us to examine the notion of an essence that is “other
15. “Manifestum est . . . verum nullum eorum esse quae sub rerum universi-
tate continentur. Nam si omnia quae sub rerum universitate continentur incom-
plexe significantur, verum autem incomplexe significari non potest, verum
proculdubio nullum eorum est quae sub rerum universitate concluduntur. Ex quo
profecto patet nihil esse oportere quod aliqua rerum sit vel aliqua non sit, quia
verum est. Multo ergo minus necessarium est aliquid esse quod Deus sit vel quod
Deus non sit, quia verum est” (ed. Martin and Gallet, p. 279).
16. “Ex hoc videtur aliquibus plura esse aeterna et aliud quam Deum esse
aeternum, licet nos frequenter addiderimus et confirmaverimus unicum solum,
scilicet Deum trinitarem, esse aeternum, et tales relationes nullas penitus facere
aeternarum essentiarum multitudinem. Firmiter igitur et fideliter supposuimus
unun solum aeternum, scilicet Deum, nec essentiam aliquam ab ipso aliam vel
divisam esse aeternam” (cf. Baur, p. 188.11–17).
17. Of course, Grosseteste follows the orthodox view that the Trinity, while a
trinity of persons, is not a trinity of essences; thus Christian dualism is quite compat-
ible with the doctrine of the Trinity. He writes, for example, in the sermon Ex rerum
initiarum: “Quia ergo necessario alter est qui gignit, et alter qui gignitur, et qui
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than” or “divided” from God. I shall return to these two features shortly. For
the present, however, let me consider briefly Grosseteste’s conception of
essence.
The term “essentia” occurs frequently in Grosseteste’s writings, perhaps
most frequently in epistemological contexts. Someone with higher grades
of cognition is said to have cognition of the essences of things (essentiae
rerum), essences stripped of material conditions. There is no reason to think
that Grosseteste is not using the concept in the same sense in the present
context. But what exactly is this sense?
Grosseteste’s use of the term “essentia” has received little attention, and
my remarks here shall be very provisional. Steven Marrone argues that
“Grosseteste held to the view also found in the works of William of Auvergne
that the essence, substance, and being of existing things were identical.”18
According to this interpretation, Grosseteste employs the term “essentia”
interchangeably with “esse” and “substantia” and does not, as does, for exam-
ple, Aquinas, contrast essence with being. Grosseteste is probably following
St. Augustine here, and especially book 5.2.10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate, in
which essentia and substantia are equated, and essentia is related to esse as
scientia to scire. Such an Augustinian influence is of course hardly surprising,
given both the esteem in which Grosseteste held Augustine and his deep
knowledge of the Augustinian corpus.
There is, however, an interesting peculiarity in Grosseteste’s use of
essentia. Augustine treats “essentia” and “substantia” as coextensive, and, as
Marrone sees, this is very often true of Grosseteste too, but this is not always
so. In fact, Grosseteste takes the notion of essence to be broader than that
of substance. Essence encompasses not just substance, but also quality and
quantity. It does not, however, encompass relations. Although Grosseteste
states this quite clearly, he says little to explain it.19 Yet it suggests a hypothe-
sis that throws light, I suggest, on his conception of Christian dualism.
procedit alter ab eo vel ab his a quo vel a quibus procedit, necessarium est aeternam
esse in Deo personarum trinitatem et, propter essentiae summam, immo supersum-
mam simplicitatem, essentiae et substantiae unitatem in tribus personis omnino
indivisam et impartitam et immultiplicatam” (ed. S. Gieben, in “Robert Grosseteste
on Preaching. With the Edition of the Sermon Ex Rerum Initiatarum on Redemp-
tion,” Collectanea Franciscana 37 (1967): p. 121).
18. Marrone, William of Auvergne, p. 159.
19. He speaks, for example, of an “alietatem formarum quae essent in se
essentiae et multiplicarent essentias (ut faciunt qualitates et quantitates)” (cf. Baur, p.
192.16–17), and notes that “non habent . . . relationes essentiam aliam et divisam
ab essentiis extremitatum relatarum et comparatarum (sicut habent qualitates et
quantitates essentias alias quam sint essentiae subiectorum)” (cf. Baur, p. 195.19–22). This
talk of qualities and quantities as multiplying essence is also implied in Grosseteste’s
opuscule on subsistence: “Res in se ipsis sunt ita quod substantia sua et quantitas et
qualitas secundum essentiam seiuncte sunt, existunt tamen coniunctae; in sensu
vero hominis et imaginatione sunt substantia et quantitas et qualitas per modum
unius, nec percipitur ibi quae est secundum essentiam seiunctio” (ed. P. O. Lewry,
Mediaeval Studies 45 (1983): p 20.)
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SUPERVENIENCE
The hypothesis is that the concept of an essence plays a role in Grosseteste’s
thought akin to the role played in some recent metaphysical discussions by
the notion of a non-supervening item.20 This is suggested by some general
remarks Grosseteste makes about the nature of relations.
In the course of his discussion of the eternal relations of God to
creatures and vice versa, Grosseteste claims that relations do not multiply
essence beyond that of their extremities or, as we should say, relata. By this
he means that to posit a plurality of relations is not as such to posit a
plurality of essences over and above the essences of the relations’ relata. A
plurality of relations holding between the same two subjects, for example,
does not posit more than the two essences of those subjects. In contrast, to
posit a plurality of substances, qualities or quantities is to posit a corre-
sponding number of essences.
Grosseteste uses two thought experiments to motivate his claim about
relations. Suppose that everything remains as it is, and that a single
thing—for example, a fly—is created. Together with the fly there will arise
relations of it to each of the other things, and vice versa, and even relations
of those relations, and so on ad infinitum. If, therefore, relations multiplied
essence over and above those of their extremities or relata, the creation of
a single fly would mean that “an infinity of essences would be produced,”
which, Grosseteste thinks, is absurd. In the same way, suppose God has only
created the heaven and the earth. Then, Grosseteste claims, it is plausible
to think that there are only the three essences—of God, the heaven, and
the earth—and yet there are various relations holding between God and the
heaven and earth and vice versa.21
20. For an outline of the notion of supervenience, from which I have drawn,
and its application to the mind-body problem, including important subtleties ig-
nored in my subsequent remarks, see D. Braddon-Mitchell and F. Jackson, Philosophy
of Mind and Cognition (Oxford, 1996), pp. 14–28.
21. “Quod autem tales relationes essentiam non multiplicant, patet. Ponatur
enim nunc unicum solum aliquid, subito creatum ceteris omnibus manentibus.
Manifestum est quod illius ad singula ceterorum multae conascentur relationes, et
singulorum ad ipsum multae relationes. Ergo si relationes istae haberent essentias
praeter essentias extremitatum, unico nato et unico addito numero rerum, duplabi-
tur vel triplabitur vel forte milletriplabitur numerus rerum. Immo et in infinitum
augmentabitur numerus earum, quia cuiuslibet relationis essentia conata ad singu-
las rerum habebit multas relationes et e contrario; et similiter relationes illarum
relationum, et sic in infinitum. Sed hoc est inconveniens, essentias scilicet infinitas
nasci si unum quid solum creetur vel si musca nascatur. Item, loquamur pro statu
quo Deus creavit caelum et terram, et intelligamus nondum egressa in esse opera
sex dierum. Numquid tunc erant plura quam tria, scilicet Deus, caelum et terra? Et
tamen tunc erant necessario creatio, dominatio <et> superpositio Dei ad has duas
creaturas, et utriusque harum duarum erant correlationes his correspondentes.
Illae relationes correspondentes nec erant Deus nec erant hae creaturae, quia
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One way to understand these remarks is, as I suggested above, in terms
of supervenience. Roughly speaking, we may say that facts of a certain kind
supervene on those of another kind, provided that any two possible worlds
exactly alike in respect of facts of the latter kind, are exactly alike in respect
of facts of the former kind. Facts about baldness, for example, appear to
supervene on facts about hair distribution, for any two possible worlds
exactly alike in respect of the facts pertaining to hair distribution would be
exactly alike in respect of the facts pertaining to baldness. Likewise, it might
be held that any two possible worlds exactly alike in respect of physical facts
would be exactly alike in respect of mental facts. The truth of such claims,
it  is  sometimes held, would  justify certain  ontological  claims: baldness
amounts to nothing over and above facts about hair distribution; mental
phenomena amount to nothing over and above physical phenomena. I am
suggesting that Grosseteste’s claim that relations do not multiply essence,
taken together with his claim that ‘essence’ encompasses substances, quali-
ties, and quantities, may profitably be viewed as a kind of supervenience
thesis, to the effect that facts about relations supervene on facts about
substances, qualities, and quantities (or some subset of such facts), whereas
facts of this latter kind are not supervenient. For this reason, we need not
take relations to introduce any items into our ontology over and above
substances, qualities, and quantities. According to this interpretation, the
concept of an essence is precisely the concept of a non-supervening item.
If this is right, Grosseteste is committed to the view that facts about qualities
and quantities do not supervene on facts about substances. (He may also be
committed to the highly contentious view that all relations are so-called
internal relations—that is, that there are no relations whose holding be-
tween their relata is not determined by the intrinsic properties of the
relata.) Christian dualism, on this construal of Grosseteste’s remarks, is the
claim that the class of non-supervening items may be exhaustively and mutu-
ally exclusively divided into Creator and creatures.
THE NATURE OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST
CHRISTIAN DUALISM
Earlier in this essay I quoted a number of arguments typical of those raised
against Christian dualism. Grosseteste focuses, as I noted above, on the
arguments that try to establish a plurality of eternal items. He believes that
subiectio caeli et terrae ad Deum nec est Deus, nec caelum, nec terra. Haec itaque
suppositio est, et non nihil sed aliquid est, et tamen nec est caelum, nec terra, nec
Deus. Et tamen non sunt nisi haec sola tria, scilicet Deus, caelum et terra, quia
suppositio haec essentiam nullam habet, nec multiplicant extra has extremitates”
(cf. Baur, pp. 192.22–193.10).
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if such arguments are to refute Christian dualism, they must establish that
there is at least one eternal essence other than or divided from God.
Grosseteste does not discuss the import of this requirement that such an
essence would have to be “other than” or “divided” from God. Why, one
might ask, would it not suffice to refute Christian dualism simply to show
that there is something eternal that is not God?
The answer, it seems, stems from Grosseteste’s Trinitarian commit-
ments.22 The persons of the Trinity are eternal. Moreover, it is true that the
Father, for example, is not the Son. But it does not follow from this that
there is a plurality of eternal essences, for the persons of the Trinity are one
in essence. Thus things can be non-identical with each other, and yet may
entail no plurality of essences. So if one accepts the doctrine of the Trinity,
one must hold that the mere fact (if there were such) that there was
something that was eternal and was not God, would not as such entail that
there was a plurality of eternal essences. Part of what would be required for
such an entailment to go through, Grosseteste intimates, is that the item in
question be other than or divided from God. We may turn again to the doctrine
of the Trinity to see the point of this requirement, or at least of the first
disjunct. The Son is not the Father, but he nonetheless is not something
other than (aliud) the Father, although he is someone other (alius).23 The
failure of otherness (alietas) appears  to be important  for blocking  the
conclusion, drawn from the fact that there are the three eternal persons,
that there is a plurality of eternal essences. But Grosseteste wishes to go
further and hold that even to establish that there is something eternal that
is not God and that is other than God would not necessarily suffice to show
that there is a plurality of eternal essences. Only a plurality of eternally
coexistent essences would undermine Christian dualism, and, Grosseteste
will argue, the truth of statements of the form “A is eternal,” “A is not God,”
and “A is other than God,” does not entail that there is a plurality of
eternally coexistent essences. For Grosseteste thinks that he can provide an
account of the truth-conditions of such statements, such that the facts
required to render them true presuppose the existence of only one eternal
22. Grosseteste’s appeal to Trinitarian doctrine must raise doubt over the
force of his defense of Christian dualism. Surely someone who seriously rejects
Christian dualism is not likely to find persuasive a defense founded on the doctrine
of the Trinity? This point, I think, requires us to reconsider what Grosseteste is up
to. I would suggest that he and his fellows are best viewed as aiming to establish the
consistency of Christian dualism with the claim that there are eternal truths and
relations. To show consistency in a set of beliefs one may appeal to beliefs in that
set. Looked at in this way, the arguments against Christian dualism may be viewed
as claiming that a Christian thinker cannot consistently adopt Christian dualism and
the view that certain enuntiabilia and relations are eternal. Grosseteste’s task is to
show that one can.
23. “ipseque Filius alius est a Patre, licet non aliud sit a Patre” (cf. Baur, p.
186.30–31).
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essence, God.24 To make this case, as we should expect, logical analysis of
the sense of such premises is required; not surprisingly, much of
Grosseteste’s discussion is concerned to provide such logical analyses.
ITEMS POSING A CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIAN DUALISM
It is now time to consider in detail the challenges against Christian dualism
that Grosseteste raises. Grosseteste focuses his attention on two problematic
classes of items: enuntiabilia and relations, although he also mentions no-
tions, reasons, ideas, and laws, presumably expecting his remarks on the
former items to carry over to these.
The classes of the enuntiabilia and relations in question may each be
subdivided into two classes, as set out in the following chart:
ITEMS THAT SEEM TO IMPLY A PLURALITY
OF ETERNAL ESSENCES
Enuntiabilia Relations
(A) Enuntiabilia about creatures (C) Relations of God to creatures
—negative existential (e.g. knowing)
(e.g. that Paul does not exist)
—future-tensed
(e.g. that the Antichrist
will exist)
—mathematical
(e.g. that 7 1 3 5 10)
—conditional
(e.g. that if it is a man it is
an animal)
(B) Enuntiabilia solely about (D) Relations of creatures to God
the Godhead (e.g. being known)
(e.g. that the Father begets
the Son)
24. These remarks do not address Grosseteste’s reference to a “division of
essences.” It is unclear what Grosseteste means by this. He appears to be using a
technical notion in this context, but he does not discuss its meaning anywhere to
my knowledge. It is possible that he is using “vel” to indicate a specification of the
sense of otherness, and that the requirement of the coexistence of the essences that
are other is precisely the force of talk of a division. In any event, when Grosseteste
discusses in more detail the requirements for a successful attack on Christian
dualism (at least one based on arguments using the notion of eternality), they are
those I have discussed in the text above.
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We shall see that the treatment of items in class (A) will require treatment
of those in (C) and (D).
Enuntiabilia
Class (A) An enuntiabile is the primary bearer of truth-value; it is what
can be stated by the utterance of an indicative sentence (known as an
enuntiatio or propositio,). Not all enuntiabilia threaten a plurality of eternal
essences.25 Only those that are eternal truths (vera) do so, and these, as the
above division indicates, fall into two classes. The first kind, those in class
(A), which shall be our present concern, concern creatures. They include,
according to Grosseteste, negative  existential enuntiabilia, mathematical
enuntiabilia (disciplinabilia), those concerning the future, and conditional
enuntiabilia. Obviously there is an important sense in which not all of such
enuntiabilia are necessary. An enuntiabile can be eternally true and yet not
necessary; the notion of eternal truth is not that of necessity. Grosseteste
treats eternity as akin to an instant of time in the sense that just as an
enuntiabile may be true or false relative to an instant of time, so it may be
true or false relative to eternity, which in this regard is treated as akin to a
time before all times. Thus, the negative existential enuntiabile, that Paul does
not exist, is true in eternity, as is that the Antichrist will exist, even though each
enuntiabile might have been false.26 And of course, also true in eternity are
mathematical truths,27 which Grosseteste takes to be absolutely necessary in
that they could not have been false, and conditionals, about which
Grosseteste has little comment. But whether or not they are necessary or
contingent, since these enuntiabilia are eternally true, it seems that they
must exist from eternity in order to provide a subject for truth, and if we
grant that they are other than and not identical with God or with each
other, it might seem that we have posited a plurality of eternal essences.
25. Occasionally Grosseteste speaks of propositiones or enuntiationes in place of
enuntiabilia. It is not clear what importance, if any, to attach to such remarks. There
appears to be a general laxity in his use of these terms, but there is little doubt that
in other writers of the period who deal with these issues, it is enuntiabilia, not
enuntiationes, that are thought to be problematic, since enuntiationes in a strict sense
are clearly events in time and thus hardly eternal entities.
26. The latter kind of enuntiabile is, however, necessary, Grosseteste claims, in
the sense that it is immutably true, but it is contingent in that God from eternity
has a power never to have known or willed its truth. Grosseteste develops this
distinction in De libero arbitrio, chap. 6 (or 7 of the earlier recension).
27. Grosseteste notes that someone might hold that mathematical proposi-
tions “non esse veras antequam res essent creatae.” But then, he replies, “saltem
concederet tales habuisse veritatem sine initio: ‘Diameter ducenda per medium
circuli erit omnium maxima.’ Item, si dicatur quod ‘Diameter ducta et cetera’ coepit
esse verum, ergo eius oppositum ante fuit verum. Et numquid illud verum Deus?”
(cf. Baur, p. 190.13–17).
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To undercut this conclusion Grosseteste aims to show that the condi-
tions required to refute Christian dualism are, despites appearances to the
contrary, not met. He is prepared to grant in the case of enuntiabilia in class
(A), that it may truly be said that they are eternal, non-identical with, and
even other than each other and God. But he claims in effect that the facts
that render these claims true do not require the coexistence of a plurality
of essences that literally are eternal or coexistent. The only eternal essence
such facts require is God. This being so, this attack on Christian dualism
based on enuntiabilia in class (A) must fail. The bulk of Grosseteste’s discus-
sion of these cases consists in explaining how the truth of the predications
in question does not require the existence of any eternal essence besides
God.
Grosseteste does this indirectly by considering some examples he takes
to be analogous to cases of enuntiabilia in class (A). Consider, for example,
the statement “Socrates known by God is eternal.” This, Grosseteste claims,
is true. And if we define the term “A” to mean “Socrates known by God,” we
may truly say “A is eternal”; indeed, Grosseteste claims, this will be a per se,
not a per accidens predication. But in the predication of eternality of such a
subject as A a non-eternal item, Socrates, is referred to, or, to use the
language of terminist logic employed by Grosseteste, supposited under eter-
nal relations.28 It is Socrates as known by God that is eternal, not Socrates as
such. According to Grosseteste, the statement “A is eternal,” in which “A”
means “Socrates known by God,” is true on the basis of the form, that is, the
relation, on the basis of which the name “A” is introduced, that is, the
relation of being known by in which Socrates stands to God. This relation is
an eternal  relation,  and for  this reason  we  may say  that  A is eternal.
Moreover, this relation in which Socrates stands to God is itself eternal
because of “God’s eternal knowledge.” Thus the predication of eternality of
A is ultimately based on the eternality of God’s knowledge. Ultimately, the
only fact required for the truth of “A is eternal” is the fact that God eternally
knows Socrates.29
28. Grosseteste also speaks of a non-eternal item as being denominated by an
eternal relation.
29. “Praeter positionem ante factam, exemplum bonum est ad hoc, scilicet
quod Deus scit omnia ab aeterno. Quapropter, si scit A, cuius definitio sit ‘Socrates
scitus a Deo,’ et B, cuius definitio sit ‘Plato scitus a Deo,’ per se loquendo verum
erit quod A aternaliter est et B aeternaliter est, et A non est B nec e contrario, et
neutrum horum est Deus. Et tamen solus Deus aeternaliter est, quia cum dicitur ‘A
non est B et B non est A et neutrum horum est Deus,’ redditur praedicatio pro
subiectis corruptibilibus. Cum vero dicitur ‘A vel B aeternaliter sunt,’ redditur
praedicatio per se gratia formae a qua haec nomina imponuntur, quae scilicet
aeterna dicitur propter scientiam Dei aeternam. Nec exigit veritas talis sermonis
alicuius extra Deum existentiam aut coaeternitatem” (cf. Baur, p.191.12–24).
Grosseteste had preceded this with another example, in this case a thought experi-
ment: “Ponatur quod ab aeterno fuisset laudans Caesarem et similiter laudans
Socratem. Secundum hanc positionem verum est ab aeterno quod Caesar laudatus
est et Socrates laudatus est, quia si est laudans Caesarem, Caesar laudatus est. Sit
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Grosseteste employs a similar strategy with the predications of non-iden-
tity and otherness of Socrates-as-known-by-God and God. What renders true
“A (that is, Socrates known by God) is other than God” or “A is non-identical
with God” is simply the fact that Socrates in himself is other than God and is
not God. In this case, the truth value of the statements of otherness or non-
identity is based on the “corruptible subject,” that is, on the fact that Socrates
himself is not identical with and is other than God. In general, in assessing
the truth-value of a statement of otherness or of non-identity in which an ob-
ject X is referred to “under an eternal relation R” and is said to be other than
or non-identical with an object Y, it is sufficient that X in itself be other than Y.
Thus, the truth of the statements “Socrates known by God is other than God”
and “Socrates known by God is not God” requires only the facts that Socrates
himself  be  other than  God  and  be non-identical with God.  Moreover,
Grosseteste holds that such statements of otherness and non-identity can be
true although the items that are other and are non-identical are not coexis-
tent, as is the case in this example, since, at least from the perspective of eter-
nity, Socrates and God are not coexistent. So no plurality of eternally coexistent
essences is needed to explain the truth of the claims “A is eternal,” “God is
eternal,” “A is other than God,” and “A is not God.”30
However, if the facts that rendered true such claims concerning other-
ness and non-identity did require a plurality of eternally coexistent es-
sences, Christian dualism would be false. Thus, Grosseteste notes that if two
items supposited under eternal relations, say B and C,
were called other or another from God or from each other because of
an otherness of existing subjects from each other, or because of an
igitur hoc nomen A, cuius definitio sit ‘Caesar laudatus,’ et hoc nomen B, cuius
definito sit ‘Socrates laudatus.’ Igitur verum erit A esse aeternum et B esse aeter-
num, ut sit praedicatio per se et non per accidens (sicut per se verum est quod
album non potest esse nigrum). Nec tamen sequitur Caesarem aut Socratem esse
aeternos aut aliquid esse aeternum praeter laudantem. Quia non redditur aeterni-
tas cum dicitur A aeternum, nisi propter laudationem quae in laudante est aeterna,
propter cuius aeternitatem suscipit aeternitatis praedictionem eius correlatam
laudatio. Tales autem correlationes ut laudatio-passio non exigunt subiectum aeter-
num aut ens aut aliquam alicuius existentiam extra laudantem” (cf. Baur, pp.
190.29–191.11); this and the preceding passage are also found in De veritate (ed.
Baur, pp. 140–41).
30. “Pono itaque A Deum, B et C duo dicta disciplinabilia vel duas res suppo-
sitas sub aeternis relationibus. Dico itaque A esse aeternum et B esse aeternum et
C esse aeternum, et nullum eorum esse alterum, et tamen unicum solum, scilicet
A, esse aeternum; nec aliquam essentiam, nec aliquid aeternum praeter A unicum
et solum. Dicuntur haec tria esse altera ab invicem propter res alteras suppositas.
Sed res suppositas per B et C non sunt, posito quod sit sermo noster secundum
statum ante creationem. Propter autem ipsas relationes attribuitur esse B et C, quae
relationes nullam habent essentiam vel existentiam extra suas extremitates et
quarum multiplicatio nullam facit multiplicationem vel numerositatem essentiae.
Propter talem igitur alteritatem non sequitur quod multa sint, quia dictuntur altera
propter res alteras, quae nihil sunt” (cf. Baur, pp. 191.31–192.11).
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otherness of forms that were in themselves essences and multiplied
essences (as do qualities and quantities), it would indeed follow that
several things are eternal.31
But this, he thinks, does not hold in the cases at issue.
These remarks may be applied directly to the enuntiabilia in class (A).
Grosseteste holds that in statements of the form “This enuntiabile is eternal,”
“This enuntiabile is not God,” and “This enuntiabile is other than God,” the
expression “this enuntiabile” is, like the expression “A” in the above example
(that is, where A means “Socrates known by God”) a designation of some
non-eternal item under an eternal relation.32 This of course raises the
questions, which Grosseteste does not address, of what such an item is and
what the pertinent relation is.
Whatever the item in question is, it is clear that Grosseteste takes it not
to be an eternal item. It belongs in some manner to the created, and hence
non-eternal order, although its precise nature is left obscure.33 It is plausible
to think that it is a state of affairs involving creatures, subject to the proviso
that such states  of  affairs involving creatures are not literally eternally
existing entities.34 Grosseteste’s point then would be that in statements such
as “This enuntiabile is eternal” in which “this enuntiabile” refers to states of
affairs involving creatures, the expression “This enuntiabile” refers to such a
state of affairs under an eternal relation. That is, where “S” stands for the
state of affairs itself, “this enuntiabile” is to be expanded to mean something
like “S Rd by Y.” But what is this relation of being Rd and what is Y? If we
are to adopt the strategy outlined above, to explain the truth of statements
of the form “This enuntiable is eternal,” Y must be a literally eternal entity,
and being Rd must be a relation S eternally stands in to Y. Grosseteste
himself expressly states that Y is the eternal Word (who of course, is one in
essence with God).35 And it is reasonable to assume that the relation in
31. “Si autem B et C dicerentur alia vel altera ab A vel ab invicem propter
alietatem existentium subiectorum ab invicem, vel propter alietatem formarum
quae essent in se essentiae et multiplicarent essentias (ut faciunt qualitates et
quantitates), bene sequeretur plura esse aeterna” (cf. Baur, p. 192.14–18).
32. “Similiter igitur, cum dicitur ‘Hoc verum aeternum aut enuntiabile aeter-
num est,’ suscipitur praedicatio haec propter formam correlativam dictioni in
Verbo aeterno, propter quam tamen correlationem nihil exigitur extra Deum esse”
(cf. Baur, p. 191.24–28).
33. Thus, Grosseteste clearly wishes to avoid a conception of such enuntiabilia
concerning creatures according to which they are the eternal reasons of things in
the divine mind: “Hoc itaque modo respondebitur ad supradictas oppositiones, aut
cogemur fateri enuntiabilia nihil aliud esse quam rationes aeternas rerum in mente
divina” (cf. Baur, p. 191.29–31).
34. I have argued that a conception of enuntiabilia as non-eternal entities is
found in William of Auvergne and underlies his solution to the problem posed by
the eternal truths. See my “William of Auvergne’s Account of the Enuntiabile: its
Relations to Nominalism and the Doctrine of the Eternal Truths,” Vivarium 33
(1995): 113–36.
35. See above n. 32.
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question is implied by the term “enuntiabile” and is the relation of being
stated (or perhaps statable). Thus “This enuntiable is eternal” may be ex-
panded to “This state of affairs as stated by the eternal Word is eternal.”
Likewise, in a statement such as “This truth (hoc verum) is eternal,” the
expression “this truth” refers to a state of affairs as adequated to the eternal
Word, since Grosseteste adopts the rather unusual view that the truth of an
enuntiabile is precisely a relation of adequation to the eternal Word.36
In the same way, we may apply the strategy outlined above to the
question of the non-identity and otherness from God of such enuntiabilia
concerning creatures. Grosseteste is prepared to say that it is true that
such enuntiabilia are not God and are other than God, but what renders
such claims true is simply the non-identity and otherness from God of the
items supposited under an eternal relation in expressions such as “this
enuntiabile” and “this truth,” and these items—states of affairs, if my surmise
is correct—do not eternally coexist with God, but are in themselves non-
eternal. So in the case of the enuntiabilia in class (A), the facts that render
true statements to the effect that enuntiabilia are eternal, other than, and
non-identical with God, do not include facts to the effect that some essence
coexists eternally with God. And for this reason no plurality of eternal
essences is implied.
Class (B) But if the states of affairs concerning creatures referred to
by such expressions as “this enuntiabile” or “this truth” are not themselves
eternal or coexistent with God, this is far less obvious in the case of those
states of affairs that solely concern God, those “in whose terms nothing of
the creature is signified,” as Grosseteste puts it; that is, those in class (B)
above. The problem is as follows. The proposition “The enuntiabile, that the
Father begets the Son, is eternal” may be true, and indeed, the subject expres-
sion may refer to a state of affairs under an eternal relation. But that state
of affairs itself, being solely about the Godhead, seems literally to be eternal
and coexistent with God, and not just insofar as it is related to God. If we
grant these points, as Grosseteste seems to do, then to avoid a plurality of
eternal essences it seems we must either deny that such enuntiabilia are
non-identical with God, or else we must deny that they are other than God.
Grosseteste sees this very clearly:
Either we must grant about any one of them that it is God (for example,
that that God exists is God and that the Father begets the Son is God), or else
we must say about any such one of them that it neither is God nor is
36. The term “verum,” it may be noted, refers to a true enuntiabile. One
problem, we may note, with Grosseteste’s treatment of enuntiabilia in class A is that
Grosseteste himself makes, and seems to treat as true, statements of the form
“Paulum esse futurum est aeternum,” in which the enumtiabile does not seem to be
referred to under eternal relations. I am not sure how he would respond to this
point. Perhaps he would hold that such statements are always shorthand for “The
enuntiabile, that Paul is going to exist, is eternal.”
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other than God, just as we say about the Father and the Son that the
Father is not the Son, nor is other than the Son.37
In other words, we must either identify them with God, or else treat their
relations to God as akin to the relations the persons of the Trinity have to
one another, the relations of being neither the same as nor something other
than the other person. Grosseteste does not specify which approach he
would prefer to adopt.
Relations
In the above account, Grosseteste accounted for the truth of predications
of eternality of enuntiabilia concerning creatures—those in class A—by
reference to the fact that in such predications the subject term involves a
reference to an item—a state of affairs, it would seem—as standing in an
eternal relation. Now this might suffice to show that the enuntiabile itself, that
is, the state of affairs in question, does not itself introduce any eternal
essence other than or divided from God into the picture, but it raises the
distinct and troubling question of the status of the eternal relations them-
selves. The worry arises that Grosseteste’s solution to the problems posed
by enuntiabilia in class (A) avoids positing one kind of plurality of eternal
essences only at the cost of introducing another kind. Moreover, the class
of eternal relations of God to creatures, and of creatures to God, is much
broader than just the class of the relations between God and states of affairs.
Grosseteste therefore devotes much of his discussion in the second recen-
sion  of De  libero  arbitrio to showing  how such  eternal  relations do not
themselves pose a problem for Christian dualism.38
37. “De his autem dictis quae de Deo solummodo sunt, in quorum terminis ni-
hil creaturae significatur, patet quod penitus nullam habent essentiam extra divinam
essentiam. Et aut concedendum de quolibet illorum quod ipsum est Deus (ut, quod
Deum esse est Deus et Patrem gignere Filium est Deus), aut dicendum de quolibet tali
quod nec est Deus nec aliud est a Deo, sicut dicimus de Patre et Filio quod Pater non
est Filius, nec aliud a Filio. Et sicut non sequitur: ‘Pater vel paternitas est et Filius vel
filiatio est, et Pater non est Filius, nec paternitas filiatio; ergo plura sunt,” sic non se-
quitur: ‘Deus est et Patrem gignere Filium est, et Patrem gignere Filium non est Deus; ergo
plura sunt.’ Quia non valet haec argumentatio nisi quando inter ea quorum unum
abnegatur a reliquo est essentiarum divisio et alietas et multitudo, quod non est in
his. Ad hoc enim, quod talis argumentatio esset necessaria, oporteret sic addere: ‘A
non est B, et A est et B est, et utrumque est aliud a reliquo, et utrumque secundum id
quod ipsum est, aliud a reliquo praesentialiter est. Tunc enim bene sequeretur plura
esse. In dictis autem illis quorum termini nihil significant extra divinitatem vel perso-
nas aeternas, non est essentia divisa ab essentia divina’ (cf. Baur, pp. 193.22–194.8).
38. The issue of the eternal  relations is not tackled in De veritate, which
includes verbatim much of the solution to the problem of enuntiabilia in class A.
This suggests that the later recension of De libero arbitrio was written after De veritate,
and that the earlier recension, which only briefly touches on these problems, was
written a little before.
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Now it is important to realize that only certain relations holding be-
tween God and creatures are eternal relations. Grosseteste distinguishes
between two kinds of relations between God and creatures.39 Some rela-
tions are such that God may, from standing in such a relation, come to be
not standing in it. He may, for example, come from being non-lord to being
lord, or from being non-Creator to being Creator. Thus it may truly be said
of God that God became Creator from being non-Creator. Grosseteste
emphasizes that this does not mean that there is any change or alteration
in God. The truth of such statements is ex parte creaturae; they express no
real change in God himself. Now since God comes to stand in such relations
of God to creatures as “having lordship over,” “creating,” “governing,” and
the like, these are not eternal relations of God to creatures, for it is incor-
rect to say that from eternity God stands in them. And similarly, the correla-
tive relations of creatures to God (for example, “being created by,” “being
governed by”) also are not eternal.
This is not true of all relations between God and creatures, however. In
particular, Grosseteste thinks that the relation of knowing is not like this.
According to Grosseteste, a statement of the form “God came to know X
after not-knowing X” could not be rendered true solely ex parte creaturae. Its
truth would require some real change in God, which is impossible. Thus,
such relations hold between God and creatures from eternity; there is no
sense to saying that God begins to stand in them. Likewise, the correlative
relations of creatures to God, say, of being known by, also hold eternally,
and do not begin to hold.40
Grosseteste’s use of the notion of knowing as an example of the second
kind of relation is significant. He is getting us to focus on the kind of
relational notions according to which something may stand in a relation to
39. Here Grosseteste is drawing from Augustine’s De Trinitate, 5.4.
40. “De verbis itaque, ut dictum est, minus dilucide intellectis, hoc fuit unum:
quod res eadem ens et non ens non est indifferens ad relationem quae est creatio,
sed eadem res, cum est et cum non est, indifferens est ad relationem in verbo
sciendi connotatam. Non est indifferens cum est et cum non est ad dominari et
creare, sed est indifferens cum est et cum non est ad Dei scire. Ideo non sequitur
quod si fit de creante non creans vel e contrario, vel de non domino dominans vel
e contrario, quod alteretur Deus. Et tamen sequitur quod si fieret de sciente non
sciens vel e contrario, quod alteretur Deus. Istud itaque verbum non sic intelligen-
dum quod res, si numquam fuerit futura, uno eodemque modo se habet ad scire
Dei, quomodo se haberet eadem res ad scire Dei si esset futura; vel e contrario,
<quod> res quae fuit futura, quomodo se habet ad scire Dei, eodem modo se
haberet  si numquam  fuisset  futura. Sed  sic  est intelligendum: quod res quae
aliquando habitura fuit esse, tunc cum habet esse, et priusquam habuerit esse, et,
si desinit, postquam desierit esse, uno modo penitus se habet ad Dei scire; quem
intellectum esse verissimum ex auctoritatibus sanctorum alias a nobis enumeratis
irrefragabiliter constat” (cf. Baur, p. 185.1–20). For this doctrine in Grosseteste and
Richard Rufus’s discussion of Grosseteste’s views, see T. Noone, “Richard Rufus on
Creation, Divine Immutability, and Future Contingency in the Scriptum super
Metaphysicam,” Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 4 (1993): 1–23.
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something else that does not coexist with it. The obvious examples of such
relations are relations involved in intentional states—knowing, praising,
seeking, and the like. Grosseteste will also want to include such relations as
“stating” and “being adequated to.” I shall refer to all such relations as
“intentional” relations in what follows.
Now such eternal intentional relations might be thought to require a
plurality of eternal essences for one of two reasons: (1) because they require
the eternal coexistence of the essences of the items they relate; or (2)
because the relations, considered in themselves, apart from their relata,
introduce essences over and above their relata. We have already noted,
however, that Grosseteste denies (2) in general for all relations. In itself a
relation adds nothing to the number of essences, over and above what its
relata add. Thus, the eternal relations of creatures to God and of God to
creatures will introduce a multitude of eternal essences only if their relata
do. But their relata do not. Intentional relations generally come in what we
might call active-passive voice pairs. Grosseteste thinks that only the subject
of the active-voice relation need exist for both the active-voice and passive-
voice relations to hold, and this seems plausible enough.41 Consider the
following pair:
Priscilla loves Elvis Elvis is loved by Priscilla
Elvis does not exist and Priscilla does. We have here the active-voice relation
loves and the passive-voice relation loved by. It is quite possible that Priscilla
stands in the active-voice relation of loving to Elvis, even though Elvis does
not exist, and that Elvis, as a result of Priscilla’s standing in the active voice
relation to him, may also stand in the passive-voice relation of being loved to
Priscilla, even though he does not exist. In order for such relations to hold,
it is necessary only that one of the relata, the subject of the active-voice
relation—in this case, Priscilla—exists.
In the case of the eternal relations between God and creatures (those
of class [C] above), the active-voice relations are intentional relations of
41. Grosseteste probably derived this doctrine from William of Auvergne, who
presents it and explicitly extends it to semantic relations such as signification and
adequation. He writes, for example, in his De Trinitate (written ca. 1223): “Nullum
enim relativorum, quae aut apprehensionem aut affectionem praedicant, aliquid
addunt aut minuunt aut dicunt in subiecto, cui velut passive assignantur, ut amatum
et apprehensum nihil in amato vel apprehenso dicunt. Et hoc est, quoniam aeque
de entibus ut de non entibus dicuntur. Nihil enim prohibet et amari eum, qui non
est, et apprehendi, et amatum nihil pati ab amante aut apprehensum ab appre-
hedente, immo, e contrario, nisi caecus non dubitat intellectus. Eodem modo se
habet et in his relativis, quae velut radicem suam habent apprehensiones aut
affectiones, quales sunt locutiones, laudationes, praedicationes, subiectiones et id
genus. Ei quippe, qui laudatur, nihil advenit ex eo, quod laudatur, nihil recipit a
laudante omnino. Et ad modum istum se habet de aliis” (ed. B. Switalski [Toronto,
1976], p. 173).
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God to creatures; the passive-voice relations (those of class [D]) are of
creatures to God.42 God, for example, knows Socrates from eternity, and
Socrates as a result is known by God from eternity. For these relations to
hold from eternity, it is necessary only that God exist eternally.43
In sum, then, the only essences introduced by relations are those of
their relata. In the case of the eternal active-voice intentional relations of
God to creatures and the correlative passive-voice relations of creatures to
God, it is necessary only that the subject of the active voice relations, God,
exist for such relations to hold. Such eternal relations therefore introduce
no plurality of eternal essences.
These remarks suffice to indicate that eternal intentional relations do
not as such require a plurality of eternal essences, and hence do not
undermine Christian dualism. Grosseteste feels it worth showing, however,
how we may treat the various predications of eternity, non-identity, and
otherness made about such relations as denominative in nature, and I shall
very briefly outline his account.
Grosseteste first notes that we may treat the active-voice relations of
God to creatures in either of two ways. On the one hand, we may simply
identify them with God, their subject. If we do so, we shall of course take
them to be literally eternal, but we shall not take them to be non-identical
with God or other than God. Alternatively, we may view such a relation as a
tertium quid in addition to its relata, as “the very ordering of one thing to
another.” If we take this course, then when such a relation is said to exist
eternally, the predication of existence and eternality is denominative in
nature. The relation considered in itself is said to exist and be eternal in an
extended sense because its subject, God, literally exists and is eternal. Also,
if we construe the relation as a tertium quid, we may say that it is not God,
but we cannot proceed to say that it is something other than God. It instead
will have to be taken to stand to God in the way that one person of the
Trinity stands to another, as being neither the same nor something other.44
42. Active-voice relations of creatures to God—say, the relation of knowing
that Socrates has to God—are not eternal, precisely because this relation only holds
when Socrates exists, and Socrates does not exist in eternity.
43. The passage quoted in n.40 suggests that Grosseteste thinks such relations
hold between God and creatures that exist at some time or other. But creatures do
not eternally coexist with God, so the eternal existence of one relatum does not
require the eternal existence of the other.
44. “De relationibus aeternis Dei ad creaturas dicendum quod ipsae sunt Deus
aut quod nec idem nec aliud a Deo. Potest enim relatio uno modo dici illa essentia
supra quam praecise fundatur ipsa relatio et a cuius essentiae esse suscipit ipsa
relatio denominationem essendi, qua praedicatur de relatione quod ipsa est. Si
itaque per nomen relationis subiciatur essentia a cuius essentiae esse et ipsa relatio
denominatur quod est, vere dicitur quod haec relatio est haec essentia. Si autem
per nomen relationis subiciatur ipsa ordinatio unius ad aliud, tunc ipsa relatio nec
est ipsa essentia nec aliud ab ipsa. Et propter hoc nulla sequitur ex talium rela-
tionum multitudine essentiarum multitudo vel multiplicatio” (cf. Baur, p.
194.19–29).
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Different remarks apply to the passive-voice relations of creatures to
God, however. Grosseteste holds that such relations may be said to be
eternal, but they cannot be identified with their subjects, presumably be-
cause their subjects (creatures) do not exist in eternity. Nor, Grosseteste
thinks, can they be identified with their object, God (I suspect because
Grosseteste thinks no relation can be identified with its object). The predi-
cation of eternality of such relations is denominative. The ascription of
eternal existence to them is based on the eternal existence of their active-
voice correlative relation. Socrates, for example, is loved by God precisely
because God loves Socrates, and because God exists and loves Socrates
eternally, Socrates’s being loved by God is eternal, and thus the relation of
being loved that holds between Socrates and God may be said to be eternal.
Grosseteste is also prepared to grant that such passive-voice eternal rela-
tions of creatures to God are other than God (unlike their active-voice
correlatives).45 But their otherness from God is based entirely on the fact
that the creature that is their subject is other than God, and this creature,
of course, is not eternally coexistent with God.46 So like eternally true
enuntiabilia concerning creatures, such passive-voice relations may truly be
said to be eternal, not God, and other than God, but these facts do not
imply a plurality of eternal essences, because these facts can all be ac-
counted for in terms of facts that involve only one eternal essence, God.
* * *
Whether Grosseteste’s responses to attacks on Christian dualism succeed
depends in large degree on the adequacy of his claims about the truth
conditions of various claims of eternality, non-identity, and otherness made
45. “De ipsis autem relationibus creaturarum ad Deum, non videtur conce-
dendum quod ipsae sint Deus vel quod sint ipsae creaturae, et tamen sunt, sicut
supra dictum est. Et ex parte extremitatis quae est creatura, super cuius essentiam
fundatur relatio illa, est illa relatio aliud a Deo, sed secundum illud aliud non coest
aeternaliter cum Deo. Nec ab ipsius creaturae esse quae nondum est ante crea-
tionem, denominatur ipsa relatio quod est, sed, ut dictum est, ab aeterno esse. Et
ideo non sequitur ex his aliqua pluralitas essentiarum aeternarum, cum tamen de
qualibet tali relatione dicatur quod sit aeterna, et de rebus secundum quod a talibus
relationibus denominantur” (cf. Baur, pp. 194.30–195.6).
46. Grosseteste considers the quibbler who proposes that “non esse alietatem
nisi simul existentia.” He holds that such a person must grant the view, adopted in
the case of the active-voice relations of God to creatures considered as the “very
ordering itself,” that “tales relationes non sunt idem cum Deo nec aliud ab ipso, et
semper erit verum quod non valet supradicta argumentatio quae pluralitatem
existentiarum plurium aeternorum videtur inferre.” Grosseteste himself, however,
thinks that it is “magis concessible Deum esse aliud a creatura quae nondum est,
quam nec idem nec aliud, et esse aliud ab Antichristo, qui nondum est, quam <nec>
idem nec aliud” (cf. Baur, p. 195.6–13).
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in the course of such attacks. If, as we have seen Grosseteste argue, such
claims can be accounted for without positing any eternal essence besides
God, Christian dualism as Grosseteste understands it remains standing. In
any event, Grosseteste’s discussion of this issue is, as I hope I have shown,
sophisticated and penetrating and makes him one of the most important of
early commentators on this problem.
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